Monday, 5 March 2018

Chijioke Ifeoma Okorie


This is a guest post by Desmond Oriakhogba (Ph.D. Candidate and Researcher in the IP Unit at the University of Cape Town) referencing the copyright infringement case against Multichoice, a provider of cable TV services in Nigeria where the court awarded damages in the sum of N6b ($16.6m)

According to Desmond:
The 8-year legal tussle in the Federal High Court (FHC) between Multichoice Nigeria Limited (MNL) and Musical Copyright Society Nigeria (MCSN) (Suit No.: FHC/L/CS/1091/11) over royalties for the use of musical works and sound recordings belonging to MCSN ended on 19 January 2018 with about N6b damages awarded in favour of MCSN.

MNL initiated the suit in 2011 wherein it claimed that MCSN is not an approved collecting society, and is not entitled to demand and receive royalties for materials used by MNL in the programs or contents hosted on their DSTV bouquet offered in Nigeria. MNL also sought a perpetual restraining order to prevent MCSN from demanding royalties against it.  Before the suit, MNL had received but rebuffed demands for royalties and pleas for meetings to negotiate royalties that may be due MCSN.

In defending the suit, MCSN also filed a counterclaim, wherein it described itself as owner, assignee and exclusive licensee of the musical works and sound recordings the copyright of which were being infringed by MNL since 2006. MCSN claimed about N10b in damages against MNL.

MNL did not deny or offer any evidence contradicting MCSN’s infringement claims. Instead, MNL argued that since MCSN was not an approved collecting society, it lacked the standing to make the counterclaim. It placed reliance on sections 17 and 39 of the Copyright Act (CA). Among others, section 39CA requires the approval of the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) for any organisation intending to carry out the task of collective management of copyright and related rights in Nigeria. Section 17CA seeks to prevent unapproved collecting societies from enforcing any rights in the CA in court. 

Musical Copyright Society Nigeria (MCSN)
It should be noted that an objection raised on this ground by MNL against MCSN’s counterclaim was rejected by the FHC in a ruling delivered on 8 October 2012. Also, at the time of filing the suit and the counterclaim, MCSN was not approved by NCC to operate as a collecting society as required under section 39CA. Although MCSN was approved as a collecting society in 2017, before the FHC decided on the case, such approval did not and could not have had any relevance on the case, given that the alleged infringements took place before such approval.

The decision
The FHC struck out MNL’s writ for the failure of MNL’s legal practitioner or MNL itself to sign the writ as required by the rules of court. The court held that the void writ did not affect the validity of MCSN’s counterclaim. It, therefore, went ahead to determine MCSN’s counterclaim and entered judgment in MCSN’s favour.

On the issue of the status of MCSN as a mere exclusive assignee of copyright, the court placed particular reliance on the case of PMRS v Skye Bank.

In the PMRS v Skye Bank case, the Court of Appeal reviewed its previous decisions on the question of MCSN’s standing to sue for copyright infringement when it is not an approved collecting society. It came to the conclusion, after finding that MCSN sued as owner, assignee and exclusive licensee, that section 16 is independent of sections 17 and 39 Copyright Act when determining the locus standi of an owner, assignee and exclusive licensee of copyright in an infringement suit. In this regard, PMRS may be regarded as the leading authority on the locus standi question until the Supreme Court rules otherwise.

On the basis of the foregoing, the FHC found that MCSN is the owner, assignee and exclusive licensee of the works subject matter of the suit, thus confirming MCSN’s locus standi in that regard.

In deciding the case, the FHC took time to examine the evidence and the state of the law on damages in copyright infringement cases. It placed reliance on previous FHC judgments and section 16(4) Copyright Act. The FHC easily found that a case of infringement has been made out by MCSN against MNL, since MNL did not proffer contrary evidence in this regard.

It took cognisance of section 43 of the Copyright Act. That section presumes a plaintiff in an infringement claim as owner of copyrights in the allegedly infringed works. Such presumption is rebuttable by a defendant, or any other person claiming to be the true owner of the works. In this case, MCSN’s claim of ownership over the works was not rebutted by MNL. This further strengthened the court's finding, and rightly so, that the MCSN is the owner of the works under issue.

Moreover, the FHC found that MNL had a duty under the Nigerian Broadcasting Code to keep its broadcast log (BL). The BL would have assisted the court in determining whether MNL used works belonging to MCSN. MNL was issued a subpoena duces tecum for this purpose. But, it failed to produce same leading to the unrebutted presumption that producing the BL would have been against MNL’s interest.

Also, the FHC found unchallenged evidence both of flagrant infringement of copyright in MCSN’s works by MNL and of financial benefit by MNL arising from the infringement. The frequency and long duration of the unhindered flagrant infringement by MNL also weighed heavily on the FHC’s mind. Finally, the FHC was guided by the need to ensure adequate reward for copyright owners in Nigerian music industry and ensure that their labour is not abused by big corporations like MNL since they are largely ignorant of their legal rights [pages 63-74].


In a reaction to the judgment, the Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON) which is the other collecting society in respect of musical works and sound recordings in Nigeria described the judgement as “bizarre and an attempt to turn [...] Nigeria music industry into a gold mine” for outsiders to the industry at the expense of “true creators and investors in the industry”. COSON opined that the judgment will not engender a “responsible intellectual property system”; it “will ruin entire companies”; it will “turn decent people against [...] collective management of copyright”; and injure the industry and Nigeria. Further, COSON expressed the view that the judgment was faulty since MCSN was an unapproved collecting society at the time of MNL’s infringement and because COSON had license to administer rights in some of the works claimed by MCSN. COSON was particularly sympathetic to MNL because of MNL’s role in job creation in Nigeria. 

COSON’s reaction seems to portray it as speaking for MNL, a company that was found to have been in flagrant violation of copyright belonging to copyright owners in Nigerian music industry. Prior to MNL’s institution of this action, COSON had been in operation since 2010 as the sole collecting society appointed by the NCC for the Nigerian music industry. It was aware of the case. For reasons best known to it, it did not take steps to be joined in the suit to challenge MCSN’s claims in respect of its works. It stood by and watched MNL fight its course on its behalf. It now cries foul on MNL’s behalf. One would ordinarily expect COSON to be on the side of copyright owners in Nigerian music industry and to commend the judgment as a victory for Nigerian music industry. Such reaction would bode well for the synergy and cooperation, which observers and stakeholders in Nigerian music industry expect to see between COSON and the newly appointed MCSN in the administration of copyright in the music industry.

Apart from being to the huge benefit to copyright owners, cooperation between MCSN and COSON will be a win-win for all stakeholders in the music industry including users of musical works and the NCC as the regulator for the copyright sector. It will lead to proper organisation of collective management in the industry and remove the likelihood of “double taxation” which users may suffer from separate licensing tariffs arising from both collecting societies.
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Thursday, 22 February 2018


Blockchain - still a buzzword but could it save the music industry?

A very recent post over on our favourite companion blog IPKat (Kats are, after all, mini-Leos) discusses blockchain in the context of what blockchain can do for IP. A very nice quote from the piece: "Blockchain need not be limited to patents; it might also be used in the field of copyright-protected works... [B]lockchain could provide a platform for the registration of copyright transfers  (not otherwise registered) facilitating parties interested in entering into a licensing agreement, thereby significantly reducing transaction costs." 

Well, that statement got this once-Leo (i.e., once a big Kat but now blogging more as a giraffe) thinking about another article, here, that is written by a musician (Imogen Heap) and similarly calls for the use of blockchain to help the music industry. Citing the lack of a global registry of works, Heap believes that blockchain would enable simplified licensing schemes and would streamline operations of CMOs and others in the industry.

In fact Heap tested the concept, releasing a song (Tiny Human, which this blogger admits to having never heard) and using smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain platform to automatically distribute royalty payments to all those involved in making the song. It seems this was a success, albeit on a small scale.

My favorite quote from Heap is as true in the blockchain context as it has been true for so many other technological advancements (think radio, cassette tapes, MP3 players, etc.): "The larger players in the industry just need to have faith that they will make more money by doing the right thing — which would lead to fair remuneration, transparency, and a multitude of new business opportunities for artists."

There seems to be no limit to the variety of applications for which blockchain is now cited as an industry-revolutionising development. Certainly CMOs in this giraffe's neck of the woods (boo!) could use help in developing transparent, efficient, and fair collection/distribution of royalties - the recent change in CMOs licensed in Kenya is evidence (see here and here). Is blockchain the right technology for this challenge?  We may soon see...
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Friday, 16 February 2018

Afro Leo

Calling all IP Teachers and Researchers in Africa!

Afro Leo is very excited to learn that the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are organising the first Regional WIPO-WTO Colloquium for IP Teachers and Researchers in Africa.

This WIPO-WTO Colloquium will be held from April 9 to 12, 2018 followed by IP Scholars Africa Conference, hosted by University of South Africa (UNISA) on April 13, 2018, both held at UNISA in Pretoria, South Africa. Here is the link with more details:

The Colloquium for IP Teachers and Researchers in Africa will:
  • provide IP academics in the region with a greater understanding of current international developments in IP law and policy, and the status of WIPO and WTO agreements and ongoing work with bearing on IP, focusing on current activities of particular relevance to the African context; 
  • map existing IP teaching and scholarship in Africa, promote cutting edge research focused on the region, and encourage the publication of high quality research as a means of building domestic capacity for adapting and applying policy options within the framework of international IP standards and the broader legal and policy context;
  • provide a forum to build academic collaboration, including on current teaching methodologies in the area of IP law, with a view to strengthening collaborative networks and academic exchanges across Africa so as to build sustained policy and legal capacity in African developing countries; 
  • identify how WIPO and the WTO can improve their support for teaching and research capacity on international IP law in Africa, on IP teaching, academic exchanges, and a stronger network of African IP scholars and teachers; and
  • prepare for the publication of presented research papers in the "WIPO-WTO Colloquium Papers: 2018 Africa Edition".

The Colloquium will be linked with the Works-in-Progress Conference “IP Scholars Africa” hosted by the SARChI Chair, UNISA, in order to:

Provide a platform for IP teachers and researchers selected by WIPO, the WTO and UNISA to present their research work in progress to a larger audience of experts at the Conference.  WIPO and WTO officials will participate in plenary panels to offer information about work in the WIPO and WTO, including on areas of capacity building and technical assistance, to a larger audience of IP scholars in Africa and beyond.
  • Offer the opportunity for WIPO and WTO to identify IP teachers and scholars in the region and create a more comprehensive database of IP scholars and their institutions, including for their future contribution to the delivery of technical assistance in the region. 
For more information please contact Karen Zaayman at or


Between 15 to 20 scholarships are available from WIPO and the WTO for IP teachers and researchers preparing a paper for publication in the 2018 Colloquium Papers Edition.

Scholarships cover: return ticket; fees related to the Colloquium; full board and lodging.

Successful applicants for WIPO and WTO scholarships will be notified by the WIPO Academy and the WTO Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division. Thereafter, they will be provided with relevant information, including travel arrangements.

Kindly inform your colleagues and friends who qualify to participate in the Colloquium and IP Scholars Africa to apply online. All applications are done online: WIPO Academy. Deadline for applications is: February 25, 2018.

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Wednesday, 7 February 2018


SOUTH AFRICANS: 6 MARCH but be quick

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Friday, 2 February 2018


Net Neutrality is dead. Long live Net Neutrality!

Our dear readers are probably by now aware that the United States Federal Communication Commission (FCC) voted (along party lines, incidentally) to end net neutrality rules put in place during the Obama presidency. See here, for example.

The decision was highly controversial, with over 20 million comments submitted during the public comment period. Most executive branch actions in the US attract far less interest. There are, however, reports that a large percentage of those comments were "fake" - e.g., not from verifiable sources or from duplicate sources.

Given that the US is a major driving force behind worldwide internet policy, does this decision mean the end of net neutrality as we know it?  Not so fast!  There may be hope yet.

Much of the governmental structure in the US is devolved to the individual States, and states can often direct national policy if they act with some degree of unity. It was with great interest to this blogger, then, when certain states began pushing back on the decision of the FCC. For example, in January, six states (including, not surprisingly, California and New York) introduced bills into the state legislatures that would require net neutrality for operators and activities in those states. In addition, the attorneys general from 22 states have sued the FCC to block the change in the net neutrality rules.

What would happen if, say, California (with a population of 40 million people and a "GDP" of $2.5 trillion, which would make it the 8th largest economy in the world if it were a country) passes a net neutrality law?  It is likely possible (technologically speaking) to have different positions on net neutrality in different states, but is such a situation politically or socially acceptable? Does the adage "as California goes, so goes the US" apply here?

California leads the nation in other areas such as climate change mitigation policy and petrol consumption standards, so it is not hard to imagine that the national rules on net neutrality may be dictated to a large degree by the actions of California legislators.

2017 saw the death of net neutrality. But 2018 will see quite a fight for its rebirth!  We will be watching this space closely...
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Wim Alberts


In a previous posting by Darren Olivier here, the decision of the American Supreme Court in In re Tam, case 2014-1203 was discussed.  Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act was declared unconstitutional, being perceived as an obstacle to the registration of the mark THE SLANTS.  The latter was seen as referring to people of an Oriental descent.  The case related to the word “disparage” in said section, which reads as follows:

“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—

(a)  Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter;

or matter which may disparage…”

The important question left open was the Constitutional status of the phrases “immoral” and “scandalous”.  This question has not been answered yet by the Supreme Court.  However, the authoritative Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit delivered a ruling in this regard ten days before Christmas in In re: Erik Brunetti Case 2015 – 1109 dated 15 December 2017 (available at Opinion.12-13-2017.1.PDF).  Rust keeps long hours  – seemingly these judges also do.


The facts simply were that an application for FUCT in relation to clothing was refused by the Patent and Trademark Office on the basis of being immoral or scandalous, the mark being the past tense of the verb “fuck”.  The matter came before the court following an appeal from the earlier ruling of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  Based on the examining attorney’s Google Images search results, the Board stated that Mr. Brunetti used the mark in the context of “strong, and often explicit, sexual imagery that objectifies women and offers degrading examples of extreme misogyny..” The court considered two issues.

1.  The mark is vulgar and therefore scandalous

The court quoted from the examining attorney’s statement “…it [the mark] is “recognized as a slang and literal equivalent of the word ‘fucked,’” with “the same vulgar meaning.” (page 5).  The court made reference to numerous sources, including Wikipedia and the Urban Dictionary.  In this regard the court remarked that “For ex parte proceedings, the Board permits the examining attorney to consider materials from the Internet, having adopted a ‘somewhat more permissive stance with respect to the admissibility and probative value of evidence’.” (page 7). 

Mr Brunetti claimed that in over twenty years of operation, he received only a single complaint about his brand name.  This argument was rejected, as possibly relating only to a specific segment of the market.  “That does not satisfy his burden on appeal, however, to establish that the Board lacked substantial evidence for its determination that a ‘substantial composite’ of the American public would find the mark vulgar.” (page 8).  The conclusion reached by the court was that the mark is indeed vulgar (page 9).

2.   Section 2(a) is unconstitutional

The crisp question stated by the court was what the impact of the Tam decision on Mr. Brunetti’s case is, specifically whether there is any basis for treating immoral and scandalous marks differently from disparaging marks.

At the outset the court referred to certain constitutional principles (page 13) that will determine how the restriction in section 2(a) will be classified.  The first principle is “that the government is said to restrict speech based on content when ‘a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.’ Content based statutes are presumptively invalid. To survive, such statutes must withstand strict scrutiny review, which requires the government to ‘prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’ United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)… (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”).

The government conceded that section 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is a content-based restriction on speech (page 14).  It also did not assert that the immoral or scandalous provision survives strict scrutiny review.  Instead, it said that the First Amendment is not indicated because trademark registration is either a government subsidy program or limited public forum. Alternatively, the government argued that trademarks are commercial speech implicating only the intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in the famous Central Hudson case. Under a less exacting degree of scrutiny, the government argues the immoral or scandalous provision is an appropriate content-based restriction tailored to substantial government.

Suppressing the urge to delve deeper into American constitutional jurisprudence, it probably suffices to state that in the remainder of the judgment these arguments were considered and all rejected.  Some selected references may be constructive though:

-  Although commercial in nature, trade marks (even though scandalous or immoral) might indeed have an expressive content (page 26).  Examples are FUCK CANCER, FUCK RACISM, FUCK HEROIN, DEMOCRAT.B.S, AND REPUBLICAN B.S.

-  “Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the government’s general interest in protecting the public from marks it deems ‘off-putting,’ whether to protect the general public or the government itself, is not a substantial interest justifying broad suppression of speech. ‘[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.’” (page 31 – with reference to the well-known decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) 55).

-  “In Tam, the Court acknowledged that it is a ‘bedrock First Amendment principle’ that “Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.’” (paragraph 31).

-  The inconsistent registration of marks, for instance allowing DIARY OF A MILF, BACKROOM MILF, MUTHA EFFIN BINGO, and IF WE TOUCH IT, IT’S FN GOLDEN, but refusing similar marks was mentioned (page 36)

The court then held that the bar in section 2(a) against immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment.


Does this case have any significance for our law? Our Constitutional Court judges have been known to dip their toes into the waters of American constitutional law, so the judgment can have value (with the caveat that our constitutional law is of course not on all fours with the American system – see, specifically, S v Mamabolo [2001] ZACC 17 paragraph 40).  The probable area of application is of course section 10(12) of the Trade Marks Act which states that a mark that is “…likely to give offence to any class of persons” shall not be registered as a trade mark.  An example of the exercise of this power is the refusal of a mark which means nothing, to wit, S FOKOL (trade mark application number 2015/12311 in class 25 dated 13 May 2015).

Not much is left on the field, apparently, in view of the Laugh It Off decision (Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International [2005] ZACC 7).  The point here is that the Constitutional Court stated (paragraph 55) that:

“It is appropriate to observe that the mere fact that the expressive act may indeed stir discomfort in some and appear to be morally reprobate or unsavoury to others is not ordinarily indicative of a breach of section 34(1)(c). Such a moral or other censure is an irrelevant consideration if the expression enjoys protection under the Constitution. Of course freedom of expression is not boundless but may not be limited in a manner other than authorised by the Constitution itself such as by the law of defamation. The constitutional guarantee of free expression is available to all under the sway of our Constitution, even where others may deem the expression unsavoury, unwholesome or degrading. To that extent ordinarily such meaning should enjoy protection as fair use and should not amount to tarnishment of the trade marks.”

In other words, for our purposes, a moral censure is irrelevant.  The position has in fact been stated to be (Devenish “We are amused: Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 2005 SALJ 792) that “Therefore, even express vulgarity and coarseness may indeed in certain circumstances be legitimate vehicles for the conveyance of ideas.” (page 802).  Would FUCK CANCER be an example here?  Notably though, it was said, in a constitutional case predating the Laugh It Off ruling, that “The rest of the prohibitions in clause 2(a) deal with the regulation of material that is indecent, obscene or offensive to public morals… There is no doubt that these are important areas with which the government, or the relevant regulatory authority, might be expected to concern itself…  They implicate important competing rights as well as the government’s interest and duty to protect those rights.”  (Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority [2002] ZACC 3 paragraph 50).  This decision however “merely” appears as two footnotes (44 and 54) in the Laugh It Off judgment, which can only imply that the Constitutional Court differentiates between offence in a broadcast, vis-à-vis a trade mark context. This interpretation would be in line with the reasoning of the Brunetti decision (page 34).

Returning to the Laugh It Off ruling: The Constitional Court’s above earlier statement on vulgarity was of course made in the context of the alleged infringement of a mark, an issue of use thus.  When the above dictum of the court is juxtaposed with the issue of registration, it would seem that the same freedom should apply.  The Registrar would be bound by the Laugh It Off case.  To be blunt, words such as FUCT or MILF would be registrable in terms of our system.  It could be the issue of distinctiveness, and not moral considerations, that might be problematic.  This aspect did not receive any attention though in the Brunetti case.

To take the matter one step further, what is the position where a famous mark is tacked onto a “vulgar” word?  In the following examples “X” is a famous airline, and “Y” a famous hamburger chain.  What approach should be followed towards the use and/or registration of the marks FUCK X’S SERVICE, and Y MILF BURGERS, both appearing on t-shirts being sold.  An apparent objection might be that in both instances there are “nude” use of the marks, meaning no apparent message or idea are conveyed.  The latter seemingly influenced the Laugh It Off court.  So Judge Moseneke stated that “What is being sold is not another beer or other product under the guise or on the back of the registered marks. What is being sold is rather an abstract brand criticism.” (paragraph 62).  Sachs J characterised the use concerned as follows (paragraph 102):

“The objective of the enterprise, as clearly understood by all those involved, was to get a message across. The sale of the T-shirts was necessary for sustainability. This was not a commercial activity masquerading as a free speech one. To say that the message could have been conveyed by means other than the use of the trademark is to miss the point of the parody. The message lies precisely in the dislocated use of the trademark. The challenge is to the power of branding in general, as exemplified by the particular trademark. It is not to the particular beer as such. It should be stressed that the question is not whether the parody succeeds in hitting the mark. What matters is that it was part of a genuine attempt to critique the status quo in our society. The scales come down unequivocally on the side of Laugh it Off. In the felicitous phrase of an American judge, the evidence shows that in the present matter the parody was a take-off, not a rip-off, and the interdict should accordingly not have been granted.

The cynical observer might say that the activities of the above party exactly amounts to “a commercial activity masquerading as a free speech one.”  Leaving that aside, one might argue from the above that both judges’ opinions are based on the idea perceived to be conveyed by the parody.  From this point of view the parodies in our examples would not have constitutional protection, carrying no particular ideological message - bearing in mind also the above quotation from Devenish that refers to “ideas”.  But parodies seem to be pervasive.  Interestingly, Judge Sachs stated (paragraph 81) “Thus, the fact that the trademark image is central to the parody does not make it automatically or even presumptively liable for restraint.”  Arguably, a “parody” shorn of a message could consequently also be protected.  

One must also note, importantly, that there was no “idea” in the Brunetti ruling, the whole judgment rested on a single (unsavoury) word.  If one adds that the requirement of “substantial economic detriment” (paragraph 56 of the Laugh It Off decision) will probably also find application, constitutional protection for the use/registration of the above examples might seem not to be so improbable.  Or would the Laugh It Off case only be relevant for instances of use and not registration?  In the former instance, can X and Y then argue that the other parties’ applications contain marks in relation to which the applicant for registration has no bona fide claim to proprietorship (section 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act), their marks being wholly contained in the applications? Or section 10(7) that the application for registration was made mala fide?


When one contemplates the place the Brunetti judgment will occupy in trade mark jurisprudence henceforth, and its import apropos freedom of expression, one cannot but make the following observation.  This is the vast difference between a situation involving t-shirts protesting a particular government’s policies, and a t-shirt with the word FUCT on it being sold at a flea market.  Freedom of expression’s meaning is, on a reasonable interpretation, stretched immeasurably.  The outcome of the Brunetti decision might be technically correct, in a mechanical way, but it remains lamentable.  It is profound in this context to note the following statements of the court at the end of its judgment (page 41):

“The trademark at issue is vulgar. And the government included an appendix in its briefing to the court which contains numerous highly offensive, even shocking, images and words for which individuals have sought trademark registration. Many of the marks rejected under § 2(a)’s bar on immoral or scandalous marks, including the marks discussed in this opinion, are lewd, crass, or even disturbing. We find the use of such marks in commerce discomforting, and are not eager to see a proliferation of such marks in the marketplace. There are, however, a cadre of similarly offensive images and words that have secured copyright registration by the government. There are countless songs with vulgar lyrics, blasphemous images, scandalous books and paintings, all of which are protected under federal law. No doubt many works registered with the Copyright Office offend a substantial composite of the general public. There are words and images that we do not wish to be confronted with, not as art, nor in the marketplace. The First Amendment, however, protects private expression, even private expression which is offensive to a substantial composite of the general public.”


Further to the above quotation, interestingly, the word “fuck” was used, in terms of mainstream films, the most times (569) in the Wolf of Wall Street (

* Please check sensitivities at the door
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